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O
ver the past 40 years, the age at which children enter ﬁrst grade has slowly
drifted upward. In the fall of 1968, 96 percent of six-year-old children
were enrolled in ﬁrst grade or above. By 2005, the proportion had
dropped to 84 percent (Figure 1, panel A, the lower line). The school attendance
rate of these young children had not declined (top line of panel A); it has held
steady at nearly 100 percent for decades. But while in 1968 nearly all enrolled
six-year-olds were in ﬁrst grade, today a substantial share is instead in kindergarten.
A similar pattern can be seen among seven-year-olds (not shown), with an increas-
ing share enrolled in ﬁrst grade rather than second grade.
About a quarter of the increase in age at school entry can be explained by legal
changes, as we will show. Almost every state has increased the age at which children
are allowed to start primary school. This change is remarkable given the strong
evidence that, in the United States, starting school later decreases educational
attainment. The other three quarters of the increase in the age at school entry
reﬂects the individual decisions of parents and teachers who choose to keep
children out of kindergarten or ﬁrst grade even when they are legally eligible to
attend. This practice is sometimes called “red-shirting,” a phrase originally used to
describe the practice of holding college athletes out of play until they have grown
larger and stronger.
Red-shirting is referred to as “the gift of time” in education circles, reﬂecting
a perception that children who have been allowed to mature for another year will
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Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 22, Number 3—Summer 2008—Pages 71–92beneﬁt more from their schooling. As we will discuss, little evidence supports this
perception. It is indeed true that in any grade, older children tend to perform
better academically than the younger children. Natural variation in birthdays
produces age differences among classmates of up to twelve months. Among young
children, even a few months’ difference in age can lead to substantial differences
in cognitive and emotional development. It is therefore unsurprising that in the
early grades there is a strong, positive relationship between a child’s age in months
and performance relative to that child’s peers. But there is little evidence that being
older than one’s classmates has any long-term, positive effect on adult outcomes
such as IQ, earnings, or educational attainment. By contrast, there is substantial
evidence that entering school later reduces educational attainment (by increasing
Figure 1
Schooling Trends for Six-Year-Olds, 1968–2005
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B: Share in First Grade or Above, by Sex 
.7
.8
.9
1
1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
First or above
Enrolled
.7
.8
.9
1
1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
Boys
Girls
Source: October Current Population Surveys.
72 Journal of Economic Perspectiveshigh school dropout rates) and depresses lifetime earnings (by delaying entry into
the labor market).
Boys are more commonly red-shirted than girls (see Figure 1, panel B). Sex
differences can’t be attributed to variation in school entry laws, indicating that
parental and teacher decisions are playing a role in the declining grade attainment
of these children. Upper-income, white, highly-educated parents red-shirt their
children at the highest rate. News coverage of this trend suggests these parents are
focused not on their child’s age, but on the age of their classmates: red-shirting
parents do not want their children to be among the youngest in the classroom.
Parents believe that older children out-compete their younger peers in the class-
room, on the athletic ﬁeld, and in college admissions. Thus, eager to give their
children an edge, parents are willing to hold them back one year in order to shift
them up the pecking order (Weil, 2007).
Academic red-shirting manifests itself when kindergarten-eligible children
enroll in prekindergarten. It also manifests itself in kindergarten repetition, which
has been formalized in some school districts as “junior ﬁrst grade,” the “readiness
room,” or the “transition room.” While the label and mechanism vary, the end is
the same: children enter ﬁrst grade—the historical entry point for primary school-
ing—at a later age. Children who enter school a year later reach the rest of life’s
milestones later. Since the transition from preschool to elementary school now
occurs later in life, so too does the transition from high school to college and from
college to the full-time labor force. In the late 1960s, 6–7 percent of 17 year-olds
were enrolled in college; now, the ﬁgure is 2–3 percent. The share of 17 year-olds
in 12
th grade or above dropped from 68 percent in 1968 to 63 percent in 2005. The
recent stagnation in the high school and college completion rates of those in their
late teens and early twenties (especially males) is partly explained by their later start
in primary school, as we will show. Recent cohorts also marry later (Stevenson and
Wolfers, 2007).
Combining these patterns, adulthood arrives later in life than it once did:
childhood is lengthening. Historically, the boundaries of childhood have ebbed
and ﬂowed. Social historians and sociologists date the concept of childhood as a
unique stage in life to the early nineteenth century (Arie `s, 1962). The concept of
adolescence arrived even later, at the end of the nineteenth century (Kett, 2003).
Arie `s argues that when life was short, there was no time for an extended childhood
or adolescence. The ﬂuidity of childhood’s boundaries is visible today in debates
over the age at which people can legally drop out of school, drive, vote, work, drink
alcohol, and engage in consensual sex.
Academic researchers have examined delays in each of these transitions, but
have done so in unconnected disciplinary and topical silos. Developmental psy-
chologists and other academics who focus on young children have debated the
effect of delayed school entry on the academic performance of young children
(Graue and DiPerna, 2000; Stipek, 2002). Labor economists and other academics
David Deming and Susan Dynarski 73who focus on young workers have debated explanations for the delayed transition
to the labor force and marriage. The Macarthur Network on Transitions to Adult-
hood has produced extensive research on this topic (for example, Danziger and
Rouse, 2007).
There are costs to the “graying of kindergarten” (Bracey, 1989), and some of
these costs arrive decades after preschool. There is strong evidence that when the
age of school entry rises, so do high school dropout rates. Many teenagers leave
school as soon as the law will let them. Teenagers who leave school as soon as they
are legally able (say, at age 17) will end up with more years of schooling if they
entered ﬁrst grade at age six than if they entered at age seven. High school
graduation rates in the United States are stagnant or falling (Heckman and
LaFontaine, 2007), and the United States is falling behind other nations in its rate
of human capital accumulation (OECD, 2004). Factors that decrease the educa-
tional attainment of young people should not be taken lightly.
Most late entrants will not drop out but will complete their educations and
enter the labor force a year later. Decreased labor force participation among
millions of young workers is salient to current debates regarding Social Security
ﬁnance. The retirement of the baby boom coupled with decreased fertility rates is
producing a sharp increase in the dependency ratio (the proportion of nonworkers
to workers). Increases in the dependency ratio tend to increase demands on
government services for things like schooling and health care, and to reduce
revenue for programs funded by taxes on labor earnings, most prominently Social
Security and Medicare. Considering the volume of economic analysis and political
debate that surrounds contemplated changes of a year or two in the Social Security
retirement age, economists should pay attention to rising age at school entry and
its implications for public ﬁnance.
Documenting the Graying of Kindergarten
While children enter ﬁrst grade later than they once did, they are not staying
at home. They are enrolled in kindergarten or prekindergarten. The top line of
Figure 2 plots the share of ﬁve-year-olds enrolled in school, which rose steeply
through the mid 1970s. This upward trend reﬂects the diffusion of publicly pro-
vided kindergarten throughout the United States; the states in the South were the
last to join the trend. Through the mid 1970s, all of the growth in the enrollment
of ﬁve-year-olds is explained by increases in their kindergarten enrollment; the two
track each other closely (Figure 2). But beginning in the 1980s, the kindergarten
enrollment rate of ﬁve-year-olds began to drop. These children were enrolled in
school, but at a level below kindergarten—public prekindergarten or privately
provided preschool.
74 Journal of Economic PerspectivesWe next examine how much of the downward trend in the grade attainment
of six-year-olds can be explained by changes in laws. As documented by Bedard and
Dhuey (2007), among others, many states have increased the age at which children
can enter school. The average cutoff date by which a child must have turned ﬁve in
order to enter school in September of a given year has moved earlier in the year,
though the cumulative change is relatively small: the (population-weighted) mean
has moved from November 25 to October 14, or by six weeks (Figure 3, top panel).
1
Most of this change happened between about 1970 and 1990. The children mechan-
ically affected by these legal changes have a birthday that falls between the old and new
cutoffs. The typical state law change shifts the entry cutoff back by a month or two,
thereby directly affecting one-twelfth to one-sixth of children in the state.
We use these legal changes to simulate the October enrollment rates of
six-year-olds, assuming that all children enter school as soon as they are eligible.
2 The
predicted enrollment rate is plotted in the top line in the bottom panel of Figure
3. Each state is weighted by its average population of ﬁve-year-olds over the 1977 to
2005 period. Roughly one-quarter of the decline in grade attainment of six-year-
olds is explained by changes in state entry laws.
1 Kelly Bedard kindly shared her records on school entry laws, allowing us to generate this ﬁgure and
subsequent analysis.
2 To simplify the calculation, we assume a uniform distribution of births across the year. Births have been
shifting from the last two quarters of the year into the ﬁrst two quarters (decennial censuses, results available
upon request), especially in southern states. This trend means that children are increasingly less likely to be
born in the months affected by the shifting in entry laws (July through December). This further decreases
the “bite” of the legal changes. Our one-quarter calculation is therefore an upper bound on the proportion
of the increase in age at school entry that can be explained by laws, as opposed to red-shirting.
Figure 2
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olds is a function not of state law but of decisions made by parents, teachers, and school
districts. Those who red-shirt tend to be a socioeconomically advantaged group. Using
regression-discontinuity methodology, Dobkin and Ferreira (2007) compare the char-
acteristics of kindergarten-eligible children who enroll in kindergarten (“compliers”)
vs. those who delay (“redshirters”). In California, the compliers have parents with
signiﬁcantly lower education levels (8.9 years vs. 10.6 years) and are more likely to be
African-American or Hispanic (59 percent vs. 33 percent). The incomes of complying
parents are 40 percent lower than those of redshirters. The pattern is the same in
Texas, with the differences only slightly smaller.
Figure 3
Changes in State Entry Laws and Their Effects
A: Average Date by Which a Child Must Be Five to Start
School in September 
S
e
p
1
D
e
c
3
1
E
n
t
r
y
 
c
u
t
o
f
f
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
B: Share of Six-Year-Olds in First Grade or Above, Actual and
Predicted by Perfect Compliance with State Entry Laws
.7
.8
.9
1
S
h
a
r
e
1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
Actual
Predicted
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Elizabeth Dhuey.
76 Journal of Economic PerspectivesPuzzles Explained by Rising Age at School Entry
Later entry to ﬁrst grade leads to a number of downstream outcomes, includ-
ing effects on “grade retention” (holding a student in the same grade for an extra
year), high school completion, and BA completion. Indeed, delays in school entry
help to explain a number of puzzles in education.
Grade Progression and Grade Retention
An outcome of interest in economic and education research is whether chil-
dren are enrolled in their “expected grade.” The expected grade is traditionally
calculated as age minus ﬁve, so that a six-year-old is expected to be in ﬁrst grade.
Being below one’s expected grade is typically interpreted as a proxy for grade
retention. As one example among many, Shepard and Smith (1989, p. 6) write:
“Despite its salience, rates of promotion and retention are not kept by government
agencies. Instead retention rates must be inferred from the proportion of pupils of
a given age who are not in the appropriate (or modal) grade.” We now show that
much of the variation in age-for-grade over time is driven not by retention and
promotion policies, but rather by the age at which children enter ﬁrst grade.
Figure 4 plots the share of children enrolled in at least their expected grade
from age six through age twelve for cohorts born in the early 1960s (1962–64),
the early 1970s (1972–74), and the early 1980s (1982–84). The intercept of each
line indicates the share of each cohort entering ﬁrst grade by age six. The slope
of each line indicates the share of children retained in a grade between age six
and age twelve. First look just at the 1962–64 and 1982–84 cohorts. For these
two groups, the intercepts are ten percentage points apart, indicating that the
later birth cohort is ten percentage points less likely than the earlier cohort to
Figure 4
Shares of Birth Cohorts in Expected Grade or Above
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David Deming and Susan Dynarski 77be on time at age six. The same holds at age twelve. The two lines are parallel,
indicating that grade retention was essentially identical for these two birth
cohorts.
For those born in the early 1970s, by contrast, grade retention played a
substantial role in determining age-for-grade. The share of this cohort behind
grade by age twelve was about 0.30—about the same as that for the 1980s cohort.
But the two cohorts ended up at the same place by very different routes, with
children born in the 1980s entering later but being retained (held back) at a lower
rate. Clearly, age-for-grade is a highly imperfect proxy for grade retention.
3
Accounting for variation in age at school entry substantially alters much-
commented-upon trends in the grade progression of students. In Figure 5, the
lowest line plots the share of nine-year-olds who are in fourth grade or above, from
1971 through 2005. There is a pronounced decline in this measure from the mid
1970s (83 percent) through the late 1980s (73 percent); the series then dips and
rises with no overall trend through to the present. Much of this variation in the
grade attainment of nine-year-olds is attributable to the age at which these children
started ﬁrst grade. If we hold constant the grade attainment of birth cohorts as of
age six, the variation is substantially muted, as shown in the top line. We ﬁnd the
same pattern when we examine the time series in the share of 13 year-olds in
expected grade. Much of the variation over time in the grade attainment of these
children is therefore a product not of changes in pedagogy, educational inputs, or
retention policy, but of historical variation in their age at ﬁrst-grade entry.
Stagnating Educational Attainment
Rising age at school entry affects our interpretation of time-series data that
focus on educational attainment at a given age. For example, a report from the U.S.
Department of Education (2007) states: “Between 1970 and 2005, enrollment rates
increased . . . for adults ages 18–34, who are typically in postsecondary education.
Youth ages 18–19 experienced the largest overall increase in enrollment during
this period, from 48 to 68 percent. The overall enrollment rate for 2005 was up
from 61 percent of students in this age group in 2000.”
Historically, until the mid 1980s, changes in the school enrollment rate of
18–19 year-olds were driven completely by changes in the college enrollment rate. As
shown in Figure 6, panel A, the college enrollment rate and the overall enrollment
rates for this age group dipped sharply together in the early 1970s, as the threat of
the Vietnam draft was lifted and returns to schooling reached their nadir (Card and
Lemieux, 2001; Freeman, 1976). The two series rose slowly together in the next
decade, as returns to schooling began to increase.
But starting in the mid 1980s, college enrollment stagnated while school
3 Cascio (2005) comes to the same conclusion using a different approach. She examines the relationship
between age-for-grade and parent-reported grade retention, which was provided in the 1992 and 1995
October Current Population Survey, and also ﬁnds that age-for-grade is a poor proxy for grade retention.
78 Journal of Economic Perspectivesenrollment continued to rise. The high school enrollment rate for 18–19 year-olds,
which held steady at roughly 10 percent during the 1970s, rose to 18 percent by
2005. This downshifting of the grade attainment of 18–19 year-olds is a male, white,
and Asian phenomenon. Among African-Americans and Hispanics, high school
attendance has held steady; all of their growth in school enrollment reﬂects
increased college enrollment. Among women, the growth in school enrollment for
18–19 year-olds rose from 46 percent in 1980 to 69 percent by 2005, and is also
overwhelmingly driven by college enrollment.
This aging of high school students affects our interpretation of changes over time
in high school completion. Eighteen is the age at which analysts traditionally measure
high school graduation, but a child who starts ﬁrst grade at age seven will still be
enrolled in high school at age 18 unless that child skips a grade or drops out. Rising age
at school entry therefore explains part of the recent decline and stagnation in high
school completion of 18 year-olds, which is shown by the bottom line in the bottom
panel of Figure 6. Again, we hold constant the year at which students start school, using
the same regression adjustment as for the previous ﬁgure. Both the adjusted and
unadjusted series show a decline in the late 1980s, but then the series that adjusts for
age at school entry ﬂattens out, as shown by the top line, while the unadjusted series
Figure 5
Share of Nine-Year-Olds at Expected Grade or Above
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Note: To generate this adjusted series, we regress the share in expected grade at age nine against the
share in expected grade at age six and plot the residuals (normed to the actual mean in 1971). The
regression is conducted at the level of cell means, weighted by cell size. These cells are deﬁned by
the interaction of sex, race, (proxied) year of birth, and nine census divisions for a total of 1,260
( 2x2x3 5x9 )cell means. We proxy for year of birth with survey year minus age. Adding ﬁxed
effects at the level of race, sex, census division, and their two-way interactions does not alter the
adjusted series. Note that in the historical Current Population Survey data we cannot distinguish
between a traditional high school degree and GED (General Education Development) certiﬁcation.
The Lengthening of Childhood 79continues to decline. Since 1990, the “decline” in the high school completion of 18
year-olds reﬂects the fact that these adolescents started ﬁrst grade late and so could not
complete high school by 18. The interpretation of this as a delay is supported by a
similar plot for 19 year-olds (not shown): much of the decline is eliminated, and the
adjusted and unadjusted series are essentially identical.
A similar pattern holds for BA completion, traditionally measured at age 22
(Figure 7). While the unadjusted series is essentially ﬂat from 1982 to 2005, the
adjusted series shows a slight increase. Again, it appears that this reﬂects delayed
attainment, since the series measured at age 23 is insensitive to this adjustment (not
shown). Both the BA and high school ﬁgures demonstrate that historical time series in
the educational attainment of young adults are inﬂuenced by changes across time in
Figure 6
Enrollment Status of 18–19 Year-Olds
A: Share in High School vs. Share in College 
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Note: For explanation of “adjusted share,” see note under Figure 5.
80 Journal of Economic Perspectivesage at school entry. This caution is important, given the frequency with which these
time series are used to infer causal relationships between public policy and educational
attainment.
Sex Differences in Educational Attainment
Sex differences in age at school entry partially explain the rising gap in the
high school completion of males and females. Figure 8, panel A, plots the sex
difference in the high school completion rate of 18 year-olds. The female advantage
was about ten percentage points for decades but began to rise in the early 1990s
and now stands at 15 percentage points.
Once we adjust for differing ages at school entry, the increase in the gap is
reduced by about a fourth. Again, if one looks instead at 19 year-olds, who have had
time to ﬁnish high school even if they entered ﬁrst grade later, the male–female gap
in high school graduation rates is lower and there is no upward trend over time.
These sex differences can be tracked yet another step to the completion of a
bachelor’s degree. The sex difference in BA completion of 22 year-olds has been
ﬁtfully rising for over 20 years (Figure 8, panel B). Women in this age group are
about seven percentage points more likely than men to hold a BA degree, up from
two percentage points in 1984. If we adjust for sex differences in age at ﬁrst-grade
entry, today’s difference is attenuated by about one point. Further, the time pattern
differs for the adjusted and raw series. In the adjusted series, there is no steady
growth in the gap until the late 1990s; until then, growth in the sex gap in BA
attainment is an artifact of sex differences in the age of ﬁrst-grade entry. This
distinction is critical for both academic researchers searching for explanations for
the gap and policymakers trying to close it. Until quite recently, growth in the sex
gap in BA attainment was attributable not to the decisions of adolescents on the
cusp of college, but rather to the decisions of parents and teachers 16 years earlier.
Figure 7
Share with a BA Degree, Age 22
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Source: October Current Population Surveys.
Note: See note under Figure 5 for details on the adjustment.
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Increasingly Academic Curriculum in Kindergarten
What are the leading candidate explanations for rising age at school entry?
4
One plausible explanation for the trends documented so far is that kindergarten is
today what ﬁrst grade was 40 years ago, and so most children—those who do not
delay entrance to kindergarten—are actually beginning the substance of their
4 Along with Brian Jacob, we are now undertaking an empirical investigation of the relative explanatory
power of each of the factors discussed in this section.
Figure 8
Sex Differences in Educational Attainment
(Female minus Male)
A: Share with a High School Degree, Age 18 
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82 Journal of Economic Perspectivesformal educations one year earlier. In this scenario, the main story is not aging
ﬁrst-graders but increasing standards in kindergarten. This hypothesis is worth
systematic investigation, and none has yet occurred. A number of papers have
criticized a perceived shift toward an academic curriculum in kindergarten (for
example, Shepard and Smith, 1988). A nationally representative time series of
standardized test scores for entering and exiting ﬁrst-graders would tell us whether
children now enter ﬁrst grade better prepared and learn more when they are there,
which would be consistent with kindergarten today being what ﬁrst grade was 40
years ago. Such a time series does not exist. A systematic review of changes over time
in curricula, standards, and lesson plans for kindergarten and ﬁrst grade would also
be informative. We have found no such review. Thus, the evidence that the
schooling of these very young students has grown more academic is primarily
anecdotal at this stage.
We conducted our own case study using curricular standards from the state of
Georgia, which were available online. Georgia’s current standards for kindergarten
do appear more rigorous than they were 25 years ago and contain some elements
of the standards once applied to ﬁrst grade. This case study is suggestive but not
dispositive; it is quite likely that the states that best document their standards are
the states that are increasing their standards, so our case study may provide a biased
portrait of national trends.
Is kindergarten the new ﬁrst grade? If so, we would expect to see a return to
this additional year of schooling in terms of academic performance in later grades
and, ultimately, labor market outcomes. The idea that kindergarten is the new ﬁrst
grade would imply that eighth grade is the new ninth grade and twelfth grade the
new freshman year of college. Perhaps such a change is occurring at the upper end
of the income distribution. In upper-income schools, high school students are
more likely today to take Advanced Placement courses than they were 15 years ago
(College Board, 2005). There is no evidence, however, that such advances are
occurring at the lower tail. Test scores provide no support for the hypothesis that
nine-year-olds and 13 year-olds are more academically prepared than they were in
the past. The share of 17 year-old students performing at a basic level of proﬁciency
on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) has not risen at a rate
that would suggest the majority of students are learning at a grade level higher than
they were 20 years ago.
Accountability and High-Stakes Testing
Accountability programs and high-stakes testing are frequently blamed as a
driver of increasing age at school entry (Weil, 2007; Stipek, 2002; Lincove and
Painter, 2006). The hypothesis is that testing in third grade leads principals and
teachers to set a higher bar at kindergarten and ﬁrst grade. However, age at entry
began to increase at least a decade before the rise of high-stakes testing in the 1980s
(as shown in Figure 1). The acceleration of this trend in the 1980s and 1990s may
The Lengthening of Childhood 83be attributable to the introduction of high-stakes testing, however, and this hypoth-
esis bears investigation.
At least some of the recent changes in legal age at school entry seem to have
been driven by concerns about performance on standardized tests. The sponsor of
a North Carolina bill to increase the school entry age noted (as quoted in Weil,
2007): “Our kids are younger when they’re taking the SAT, and they’re applying to
the same colleges as the kids from Florida and Georgia.” When California raised its
entry age, the legislation cited the fact that the state’s children were younger than
those in other states in the same grade (cited in Stipek, 2002) and so were at a
disadvantage in testing. Thus, states may be engaging in a “kindergarten arms race,”
with children starting school at an ever-increasing age in order to gain a perceived
advantage on standardized tests.
Red-shirting may be an unintended consequence of greater school account-
ability. Those who decide when a child will start school—kindergarten teachers,
elementary school principals, young parents—are focused on the short-term ben-
eﬁts that delay can offer. Principals and teachers care about the welfare of their
young students, and increasingly they are held accountable for their test scores.
They are not held accountable for reduced labor force participation or increased
dropout rates; in fact, they do not typically even observe these outcomes.
Competition among Parents
Red-shirting parents appear to believe that relative age matters for children’s
performance. There is no evidence of a lasting beneﬁt to education or earnings
from being older than one’s classmates. There is, however, evidence of a lasting
competitive advantage in sports. In Europe and the United States, children on elite
youth soccer, hockey, swimming, and tennis teams are disproportionately born just
after the age cutoff for those leagues—that is, they are the oldest of their peers. This
early advantage persists, with 60 percent more Major League Baseball players born
in August than in July, mirroring the near-universal age cutoff of July 31 in youth
baseball. Spira (2008) discusses this literature, but see also Glamser and Vincent
(2004), Barnsley, Thompson, and Barnsley (1985), Barnsley and Thompson
(1988), and Musch and Grondin (2001). Relative age effects could plausibly persist
in other tournament settings. Admission to the most elite colleges is a rank-order
tournament, for example. We are exploring whether age effects persist in this
competitive arena.
Note that rank-order age effects are (at best) a zero-sum phenomenon. When
one child moves up the classroom age rank, another moves down. Whatever their
effect on individual outcomes, changes in relative age cannot increase social
welfare. In fact, by allowing (or encouraging) parents to manipulate the age rank
of their child in the classroom, schools may set off a cycle of social pressures that
steadily pushes up the age of children at school entry, to the detriment of social
welfare. The presence of older, more mature children in a class may lead teachers
to raise their standards, resulting in lower relative performance and increased
84 Journal of Economic Perspectivesgrade retention rates for children who enter school at the statutory age. These
increasing standards could, in turn, lead school districts to raise their statutory or
recommended age at school entry to ready children for the increased classroom
rigor. And as the age of school entry rises, another round of parents will be induced
to red-shirt their children so that they can maintain their rank in the classroom age
distribution. This dynamic would be self-reinforcing, with parents always seeking to
have their children be oldest in the class, relative standards rising, age of the entire
class rising, and a yet-older set of children red-shirted.
In this sort of unraveling game, government can increase social welfare by
constraining private decisions. One solution would be to set a single age at which
children both can and must enter school. This is the approach taken in Norway,
where students start school the year they turn seven and any exceptions are granted
only upon a formal request and justiﬁcation (Black, Devereaux, and Salvanes,
2008).
Childhood as a Normal Good
One explanation for delayed school entry is that parents obtain utility from
keeping their child out of primary school for an additional year. As incomes rise,
and if childhood is a normal good, parents may choose to purchase an additional
year of childhood. The demographic patterns of red-shirting are consistent with
this explanation, with higher-income, better-educated parents more likely to hold
their children back. Given the rise in preschool enrollment of three- and four-year-
olds and sharp increases in maternal employment, however, the desire for time with
one’s young children is not the explanation. Still, parents may view the start of
formal schooling as a symbolic transition out of childhood and so choose to delay
it if they can afford to do so. They may fund this delay individually, by paying for
private preschool, or socially, by voting for free, public prekindergartens.
Costs and Beneﬁts of Increasing Age at School Entry
It may be that delayed schooling is a productive investment, and parents,
teachers, and policymakers are making rational choices. When would delay be
productive? In the classical human capital model, education is an investment that
produces returns over the lifetime. Increasing the age at which children start school
is efﬁcient only if the (discounted) beneﬁts of this delay at least equal its (dis-
counted) costs. In this section, we start with a brief, theoretical overview of these
costs and beneﬁts and then move to assessing the empirical evidence on these
questions. In theory, the welfare calculation is conceptually straightforward. But the
empirical evidence in this area is incomplete, and more research is needed to get
a ﬁrmer grasp on the welfare implications of increasing age at school entry.
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We start with the possible beneﬁt of delaying school entry. Consider a setting
in which adolescents cannot quit school until they have completed a certain
number of years (as in most of Europe); this simpliﬁes the analysis. Given (say) ten
years of compulsory schooling, does more learning occur if school starts at age
seven than if it starts at age six? We can think of reasons why this would be true. A
more mature child may have a greater capacity to learn, building more human
capital for each year in school; that is, the more mature child may learn more
efﬁciently. This idea lies behind many educators’ positive views toward red-shirting
and corresponds to the “maturationist” model of development psychology. If the
maturationist model is correct, then the secular increase in age at school entry will
make each year of schooling more effective in generating human capital. An
alternative model is the “experientialist” perspective, in which children learn to
learn by interacting with others and through new experiences. If the experientialist
model is correct, then delaying school only delays learning and produces no social
or private beneﬁts.
Now we consider the theoretical costs of delaying school entry. Holding
constant retirement age, a person who starts school a year later spends one less year
in the labor force. The ﬁnancial losses from starting one year later consist of one
year of labor market earnings, as well as the lifetime return to that lost year of labor
market experience. In our simpliﬁed setting, then, the cost–beneﬁt calculation
weighs the loss of a year of labor market earnings and experience against any
additional human capital acquired due to later school entry.
Finally, we modify this setting slightly. In the United States, compulsory school-
ing laws constrain children to remain in school not for a given number of years but
until a given age. Child labor laws, which reduce the opportunity cost of schooling
by restricting the ability of children to earn money, are also deﬁned based on age.
Therefore, the calendar age of students is what constrains their schooling decisions:
the younger a student at school entry, the more schooling that student is constrained
to obtain. In the United States, then, the cost–beneﬁt calculation weighs the value
of lost years of labor market experience and education against the value of any
enhancements to learning that occur due to later school entry.
Costs and Beneﬁts of Increasing Age at School Entry: Empirical Evidence
Estimating the effect of age at school entry on education and labor market
outcomes is empirically challenging. Children who enter school later are likely
different from those who start earlier. This produces omitted variables bias in a
regression of these outcomes on age at entry. The bias is of an unpredictable sign.
Some children will start late because they are developmentally delayed, inducing a
spurious, negative correlation between age at school entry and the outcomes of
interest. Others will start late because their parents want them to rank high in the
pecking order of their class and have resources to pay for an extra year of private
child care, inducing a spurious, positive correlation between age at school entry and
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unpredictably biased regressions; they typically conclude that there is an academic
advantage to starting later but that it is gone by third grade.
Assume for the moment that the age at which children start school is randomly
assigned, so our omitted-variables biases magically melt away. A researcher tests
children in a given grade and relates their scores with their age at school entry. The
researcher sees that children who start school later have higher test scores and
GPAs. Is this conclusive evidence that starting school later improves learning? No.
Among children in a given grade, the researcher can’t separate the effect of age at
school entry from that of age at test. In a given grade, any child who starts school later
is also older when she takes the test. Except among those children who repeat (or
skip) a grade, age at entry and age at test are perfectly collinear (Black, Devereaux,
and Salvanes, 2008): that is, age at test  age at entry  years of schooling. This
connection poses a big problem for researchers, because age-at-test effects on test
scores are strong and positive. This connection holds especially among young
children, for whom a few months can make a large difference in cognitive devel-
opment. Even before children enter school, a few months’ difference in age pro-
duces large differences in cognitive skills (Elder and Lubotsky, forthcoming). A
teacher or principal observing these differences might conclude that, since older
children in kindergarten do better than younger children, we should increase the
kindergarten entry age. But the bottom line is that researchers cannot determine
the effect of age at school entry by studying school-age children, since we can never
get away from the fact that age-at-test rises in lockstep with age-at-entry.
5
Among adults, we have some hope of estimating the effect of age at school
entry (if we have dealt with the omitted variables problem). Among adults, do we
ﬁnd a strongly positive correlation between age at school entry and earnings or IQ?
No. Researchers have shown that adults in Norway and Sweden who entered school
later have slightly lower earnings and IQ. These studies have exploited sharp
discontinuities in the impact of school entry laws to eliminate omitted variables bias
(Black, Devereaux, and Salvanes, 2008; Fredriksson and Ockert, 2005).
In the United States, researchers have also established a negative, causal link
between age at school entry and education and labor market outcomes. One of the
best-grounded ﬁndings in the economics of education is that compulsory schooling
laws matter. Using multiple methods, multiple datasets, and multiple natural
experiments, researchers have consistently found that legal constraints on when
children can enter school, exit school, and work for pay signiﬁcantly affect their
school attendance and attainment. Angrist and Krueger (1991, 1992) launched this
literature with their analysis of the relationship between quarter of birth, educa-
5 A number of recent studies have used quasi-random methods to examine the relationship between age
at entry and academic performance (Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Puhani and Weber, 2007; Elder and
Lubotsky, forthcoming). While they deal successfully with omitted variables bias, they are unable to
untangle the effects of age at entry and age at test.
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The typical entry rule for these cohorts was that children who would turn six by the
end of December could start ﬁrst grade in September. Children born in the ﬁrst
quarter would therefore have to wait until the September after they had turned six
to enter ﬁrst grade, while their peers born in the fourth-quarter could enter up to
three months before they turned six. The consequence of this later entry was that
those born in the ﬁrst quarter were one to two percentage points less likely to
graduate high school than those born in the last quarter. These reductions in
education have been shown to decrease life expectancy (Lleras-Muney, 2005),
happiness (Oreopoulos, 2007), and civic participation (Dee, 2004; Milligan, Mor-
etti, and Oreopoulos, 2004), as well as to increase crime rates (Lochner and
Moretti, 2004), and earnings.
Angrist and Krueger (1991, 1992) concluded that the relevance of compulsory
schooling laws was fading with time, as social norms about children’s work and
education shifted. However, among recent birth cohorts the effects of compulsory
schooling laws on high school graduation rates are about as large as those estimated
by Angrist and Krueger (Dobkin and Ferreira, 2007). This outcome may be due to
rising age at school entry, which makes a given school exit law bind for more young
adults. Using regression-discontinuity methods with data on exact date of birth
from Texas and California, Dobkin and Ferreira show that those assigned (by entry
laws) to enter school a year later are about one percentage point less likely to
complete high school. Among Hispanics, the reduction is twice as large.
Two recent papers appear to contradict this extensive literature on the negative
impact of later entry on educational attainment. Bedard and Dhuey (2006) ﬁnd that
those who enter later are more likely to attend a university track in British Columbia
and more likely to take exams required for admission to a selective college and to
attend a four-year college in the United States. Puhani and Weber (2007) similarly ﬁnd
that those who enter school later are more likely to follow the Gymnasium university-
preparatory track in Germany. But these studies show no positive impact of age at
school entry on years of completed education. Their results, like the research on
competitive athletes, are consistent with the idea that relative age provides an advan-
tage in rank-order tournament competitions, which characterizes admission to elite
schooling tracks, selective universities, and competitive sports teams.
Most students who delay school entry will not drop out of high school. For
them, the cost of delayed school entry is delayed entry into the labor force.
Assuming a ﬁxed retirement age, these adults will have one less year of earnings at
the start of their work life, and their subsequent earnings will be lowered by the loss
of one year of experience. Data from Norway and Sweden conﬁrm this prediction:
those who started school later than their peers have lower annual earnings when
they are in their mid 20s (Fredriksson and Ockert, 2005; Black, Devereaux, and
Salvanes, 2008), though this negative effect appears to fade as workers age (Black,
Devereaux, and Salvanes, 2008). This ﬁnding makes intuitive sense: the loss of one
88 Journal of Economic Perspectivesyear of experience will have a larger impact on workers who have recently entered
the labor force than workers with decades of experience.
Decreased labor force participation has social as well as private costs. The increase
in the dependency ratio caused by dropping fertility and the retirement of the baby
boomers has been the subject of intensive discussion. The Social Security retirement
age has recently been raised by two years, from 65 to 67. The intent of this new policy,
which was the subject of extensive economic analysis and political debate, was to
increase the years that workers spend paying into Social Security. Figure 1 suggests that
this effort will partially be undone by increasing age at school entry. One out of six
children born in 1999 delayed ﬁrst grade by a year. These delayed students will be
delayed workers who pay one year less into the Social Security system.
Conclusion
Given the pace of research in this area, we will likely soon have the evidence
we need to more conﬁdently calculate the social welfare consequences of the
graying of kindergarten. While we cannot yet say whether the net effect is zero or
negative, we can say with near certainty that increasing age at school entry inten-
siﬁes inequality in human capital and social welfare. Both red-shirting and increases
in the legal age of school entry have this variance-increasing effect on social welfare.
First, increases in the age of legal school entry intensify socioeconomic differ-
ences in educational attainment. Lower-income children are at greater risk of
dropping out of school when they reach the legal age of school exit; increases in
age at school entry therefore disproportionately decrease their completed educa-
tion. Further, young children who enter school later spend more time in unequal
environments. Whether at home or in formal care, children who start school later
linger in settings whose quality is positively correlated with parents’ human capital.
This point is exactly the one made by advocates of early childhood interventions:
insofar as home environments are unequal, delaying public schooling increases the
likelihood of unequal outcomes (Kirp, 2007; Heckman and Masterov, 2007).
Second, red-shirting disadvantages children who enter school on time. In kinder-
garten, the most advantaged children are the oldest in the class, reinforcing socioeco-
nomic gaps in school readiness: “[C]hildren who may be at academic risk from factors
associated with poverty face the additional hurdle of being compared to advantaged
children 12 to 15 months older. . . . the youngest children may appear to be immature
and unready to tackle the tasks their signiﬁcantly older classmates ﬁnd challenging and
intriguing” (Crosser, 1998). Younger children in the classroom are more likely to be
labeled as learning disabled (Elder and Lubotsky, forthcoming). Ironically, the racial
and socioeconomic segregation of the United States softens this dynamic, since in our
school districts the most advantaged and least advantaged children rarely share a
David Deming and Susan Dynarski 89classroom. But the standardized test scores of children of the same grade are compared
across districts and states, and the relative ages of these children will contribute to the
distance between the scores of rich and poor districts.
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